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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the court would permit a verdict to stand" 44 and adopted what it considered
to be the majority rule. This latter rule allows the plaintiff to recover
"an amount which the court considers reasonable."45 Although the court's
attention in that case was directed at achieving finality at trial, it would
seem incongruous-and certainly more confusing-to adopt one standard
for trial and another for appeal. In any event, the difficulty in fitting an
exact dollar amount to the standard adopted will be magnified since the
appellate court is one step further removed from the interplay of facts
which give rise to certainty at the trial level.
Assuming that we are safe in attributing to the judiciary a degree of
objectivity, insight and forbearance, then the Wisconsin rule may prove
to be a valuable procedural tool. While not completely foreclosing appellate
review to the remitting party, its limitation of applicability to cross-
appeals tends to discourage frivolous appeals by defendants. In this respect,
it could work to bring finality to more trial court decisions. Its inherent
fairness leaves little room for criticism. Indeed its only defect-if it may
properly be called such-is an underlying faith in the ability of appellate
courts to pass upon damages. With a recognition of their own weaknesses
in this area, however, appellate courts could easily avoid this problem
through a degree of judicial restraint.
WILLIAM W. MAYWHORT
Constitutional Law-State Action-You Can't Take the City Out of
the Park, But You Can Take the Park Out of the City
In 1966 the Supreme Court ruled that Baconsfield Park in Macon,
Georgia, had acquired such "momentum" as a public facility that the
mere changing from trustees who were public officials acting in their
official capacity to private trustees would not dissipate the unconstitutional
state action sufficiently to permit the park to be operated on a segregated
basis.' By 1970 that momentum seemed to have run out. In Evans v.
Abney2 the Court ruled that the decision of the Georgia courts that the
park must revert to the heirs of the testator did not involve sufficient
state action to violate the fourteenth amendment.
" Id. at 90, 102 N.W.2d at 400.
"5 Id.
'Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
2396 U.S. 43.5 (1970).
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In 1911 Augustus 0. Bacon had executed a will that devised to the
Mayor and Council of the City of Macon a tract of land in trust for the
use of the white women and children of Macon as a park and pleasure
ground. Eventually the trustees, realizing that they could not legally
operate a segregated park,3 permitted Negroes to use the park facilities.
Members of the board of managers, set up under the will to control the
park,4 brought an action in the Georgia courts to remove and replace the
trustees for breach of trust. Several Negro citizens then intervened seek-
ing to insure the integration of the park.5 The case, Evans v. Newton,6
eventually reached the Supreme Court of the United States which held
that the park could not be operated on a segregated basis by the trustees
designated under the will or any other newly appointed private trustees.
Following this decision the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that the
trust had failed and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the
disposition of the property.7 There the Negro intervenors and the At-
torney General of Georgias urged that the court apply the doctrine of cy
pres9 and excise the discriminatory language. The trial court however
'See Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957)
(per curiam) (agent of state violates fourteenth amendment when, acting as trustee,
it discriminates on basis of race).
'The will provided:
[A]ll right, title and interest in and to said property . . . shall thereupon
vest in and belong to the Mayor and Council of the City of Macon, and to
their successors forever, in trust for the sole, perpetual and unending, use,
benefit and enjoyment of the white women .... and white children of the
City of Macon to be by them forever used and enjoyed as a park and
pleasure ground, subject to the restrictions, government, management, rules
and control of the Board of Managers hereinafter provided for .... The
members of this Board shall . . . be selected and appointed by the Mayor
and Council of the City of Macon ....
Record at 19, Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
'Certain heirs of Bacon also intervened asking for a reversion of the trust should
the prayer for removal of the trustees be denied but the trial court did not find
it necessary to rule on the reversion since new trustees had been appointed. Newton
v. City of Macon, 9 RAcE REL. L. REP. 309, 310 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1964).
°382 U.S. 296 (1966).
221 Ga. 870, 148 S.E.2d 329 (1966).
'By statute the Attorney General or solicitor general of the situs of the trust
represents the interests of the beneficiaries in all legal matters pertaining to the
administration and disposition of charitable trusts. GA. CODE ANN. § 108-212
(1969).
*GA. CoDE ANN. § 108-202 (1959) provides:
When a valid charitable bequest is incapable for some reason of execution
in the exact manner provided by the testator, donor or founder, a court of
equity will carry it into effect in such a way as will as nearly as possible
effectuate his intention.
GA. CODE ANN. § 113-815 (1959) provides:
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held that the will lacked the general charitable intent necessary to the
application of cy pres ;1O that the racial discrimination was an essential
and inseparable part of the testator's plan; and that, since the will did not
provide for an alternate disposition of the property in the event of the
failure of the trust, it reverted to the heirs of the testator." The Supreme
Court of Georgia affirmed, rejecting the contention that to do so would
be judicial enforcement of racial discrimination amounting to a denial of
equal protection in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 12 On certiorari
the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Georgia decision
because the Court did not find sufficient state action to attribute the dis-
crimination to the state.
13
The Court's holding is somewhat surprising in view of its recent
willingness to find discriminatory state action in civil rights cases 14 and
in view of Shelley v. Kraemer,"5 which, at first glance, would seem to
dictate a reversal.
Shelley concerned the use of state courts to enforce racial restrictive
covenants involving residential housing. The covenants were being used
A devise or bequest to a charitable use will be sustained and carried out in
this state; and in all cases where there is a general intention manifested by
the testator to effect a certain purpose, and the particular mode in which he
directs it to be done shall fail from any cause, a court of chancery may, by
approximation, effectuate the purpose in a manner most similar to that indi-
cated by the testator.
10 In some cases . . . it appears that the accomplishment of the particular
purpose and only that purpose was desired by the testator and that he had
no more general charitable intent and that he would presumably have pre-
ferred to have the whole trust fail if the particular purpose is impossible of
accomplishment. In such a case the cy pres doctrine is not applicable.
4 A. ScoTT, LAw OF TRUSTS § 399, at 3085 (3d ed. 1967).
" GA. CODF ANN. § 108-106(4) (1959) provides:
Where a trust is expressly created, but no uses are declared, or extend only
to a part of the estate, or fail from any cause, a resulting trust is implied for
the benefit of the grantor, or testator, or his heirs.
11224 Ga. 826, 165 S.E.2d 160 (1968).
Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
"See, e.g., Local 590, Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968) (state delegating power to owners of shopping center by per-
mitting them to use trespass laws to prohibit exercise of first amendment rights) ;
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (amendment to state constitution giving
racial discrimination in housing a preferred position in the law); Robinson v.
Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964) (existence of a manual of the state board of health
embodying state policy of putting burdens on restaurants serving both blacks and
whites sufficient to preclude conviction of sit-in demonstrators for trespass);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (discrimination
by lessee of state property attributed to state's failure to require nondiscrimination,
making state significantly involved in the discrimination).
15334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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by private citizens to effect a sort of racial zoning that was so widespread
non-Caucasians were effectively being denied the opportunity to buy or
rent most of the desirable residential property in the country. 6 Since it
had been decided 17 that states could not use racial zoning without in-
fringing the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866,"s
and because the Civil Rights Cases 9 had established that the fourteenth
amendment proscribed only state action and did not speak to private acts,
the Court in Shelley was faced with a real dilemma. It was the power
of the states operating through their judiciaries that made the discrimina-
tion work; yet the discriminatory motivation came from private citizens.
The Court's solution was to combine the two earlier rulings into a holding
that, because they were between private parties, the racially restrictive
covenants themselves were constitutionally permissible but "that in grant-
ing judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases, the
states [had] denied [the] petitioners the equal protection of the laws.
' '20
Five years later the Court expanded that ruling by holding in Barrows v.
Jackso. l that one who breached a racial covenant could not be required
to answer in damages to his co-covenantor for the breach because it
would amount to using the coercive power of the state to compel, in-
directly, compliance with a covenant that was unenforceable directly.
Taken together Shelley and Barrows could be read to support the
proposition that any time an individual uses the power of the state courts
to effect a discriminatory purpose the fourteenth amendment has been
violated ;22 however the cases themselves had not gone that far, and it
was unclear how far they might be expanded. Nor has any direct answer
been received because the Court has not since Barrows relied substantially
on Shelley.23 This has not been due to any lack of cases presenting prob-
" See C. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY (1959).
" Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
" Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. a1, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 now embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1964).
10109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
20334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948). That judicial action was state action capable of in-
fringing the fourteenth amendment had been decided in Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 347 (1879). Shelley was novel because the discrimination originated
with the private litigants but was attributed to the court.
21346 U.S. 249 (1953).
22 One early commenator felt Shelley alone established that "no determination
[by a state court] of a relationship which may vary with the race of the persons in-
volved will satisfy [the] requirements [of the fourteenth amendment]." Ming, Racial
Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16
U. CHaI. L. REv. 203, 234 (1949).
" Shelley has been cited by the Court with some frequency to support minor
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lems susceptible to being resolved on the basis of Shelley but because the
Court has either denied certiorari 4 or handled the cases it has heard in
such a way that the scope of Shelley has become more uncertain .2
One year after Barrows the Court split evenly over the constitutionality
of a state court's action permitting a cemetery company to rely on a
Caucasians-only clause of a contract as a defense in an action for breach
of contract.26 The cemetery had refused to inter the remains of the plain-
tiff's husband because he was an American Indian. The following term
the Court held, without mentioning Shelley, that a state court decision
that membership in the Communist Party constituted just cause for dis-
charge under an employment contract did not raise a federal question ;27
three members of the Court felt Shelley compelled a reversal.28
The Court's failure to clarify the scope of Shelley provoked various
proposals by commentators as to its real meaning. Professor Pollak sub-
mitted that the underlying principle was that the state may not assist "a
private person in seeing to it that others behave in a fashion which the
state itself could not have ordained."' 29 Others suggested Shelley be con-
fined to cases in which the impact of the discrimination is so broad as to
take on the aspects of a governmental function 0 using the rationale of
Marsh v. Alabamca1 and the white primary decisions.32 Another com-
points. E.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958) (citing Shelley for the
proposition that fourteenth amendment applies to action of state judiciary). But
see Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960) (per curiam)
(involving power of state court to determine rights of competing factions of re-
ligious group).
"E.g., Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 228 (1955), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 947 (1955) (judicial enforcement of will provision revoking gift to child
for marrying person not born to Jewish faith not violative of the fourteenth amend-
ment); Charlotte Park & Rec. Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114
(1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956) (holding Shelley did not prevent reversion
of property donated to city for use as park for whites only, because reversion would
occur without the aid of the court if Negroes were permitted to use the facility).
"5E.g., Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70 (1955);
Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956) ; cases cited note 34 infra.
2" Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 348 U.S. 880 (1954). The
Court reheard the case the next term but dismissed the writ of certiorari as im-
providently granted noting that a recent act of the state legislature would preclude
a further occurrence in that jurisdiction. 349 U.S. 70 (1955)."7 Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956).
28 Id. at 302.
" Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1,
13 (1959).
"0 Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1108-1120
(1960).
21326 U.S. 501 (1946) (owner of company town acting so much like agency of
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mentator argued that it be viewed as a general prohibition of state en-
forcement of private discrimination that the state itself could not require,
but that exceptions should be made where the discriminator has a com-
peting claim of basic rights which outweighs the victim's claim to equal
protection.
3
In the early sixties the advent of the civil rights sit-in demonstration
with its subsequent arrests and convictions for violation of trespass statutes
seemed to provide the ideal vehicle for clarifying Shelley. The Court
however chose to avoid the Shelley question and decide the cases on other
grounds.3 4 The thoroughness with which the issue was avoided is indi-
cated by the fact that Shelley was not once mentioned in a majority
opinion though it appears in both dissenting3 5 and concurring36 opinions
as well as briefs of counsel.3 7 This prompted one writer38 to announce
that Professor Wechsler had been right when he characterized Shelley as
the state that it may not use force of state trespass laws to abridge first amendment
rights in manner forbidden to state).
" E.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (exclusion of Negroes by Dem-
ocratic Party prevented them from participating in primary and violated fifteenth
amendment because primary was part of machinery for choosing elected officials) ;
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (unofficial private primary which excluded
Negroes and effectively determined who officeholders would be violated fifteenth
amendment).
" An illustration of this position would be where a homeowner has a trespasser
prosecuted and concedes that his only reason for doing so was the race of the
trespasser.
Even when one excludes on the basis of race, the state which helps give effect
to the exclusion is implementing a general, basic, proprietary right, reaching
far back into and behind the common law; the enforcement of discrimina-
tion is incidental. The victim of such discrimination, on the other hand,
suffers a minor limitation and a limited and unpublic indignity.
Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv.
473, 498 (1962).
" See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) (trespass statute
did not give fair notice that refusing to leave after being requested to do so was
prohibited); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (reversed and remanded so
state court could determine whether state law required dismissal of the charge
because legislation enacted subsequently made defendants' conduct lawful) ; Peter-
son v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (discriminatory action attributed to
state because local ordinance compelled segregation in eating facilities) ; Lombard
v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963) (discriminatory action attributed to state
because statements by local officials that sit-ins would not be tolerated was form of
compulsion).
" Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 328 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting).
"Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 278 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
"I E.g., Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 8, Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226
(1964).
" Paulsen, The Sit-in Cases of 1964: "But Answer Cane There None," 1964
Sup. CT. REv. 137, 151.
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an ad hoc decision "yielding no neutral principles for [its] extension or
support." 39
Evans v. Abney provided the Court with yet another opportunity to
update the status of Shelley since the strongest arguments for preventing
the reversion were based on Shelley. ° Mr. Justice Brennan in his dis-
senting opinion in Abney stated that Shelley "stands at least for the
proposition that where parties of different races are willing to deal with
one another a state court cannot keep them from doing so by enforcing
a privately authored racial restriction."41 This is very close to Professor
Pollak's interpretation of Shelley42 and can be easily applied to the facts in
Abney. The testator was the sole author of the racial restrictions, not
the state. The litigation was commenced because the trustees under the
will had allowed non-whites to use the park.48 Thus it is apparent that the
trustees were prepared to deal with those discriminated against by the
terms of the will, and it is clear from the intervention of the local Negroes
that they wished to use the park. Although the attempt to enforce spe-
cifically the racial provisions of the will was defeated by Evans v. Newton,44
Abney enforces them indirectly. The title and right to use the property
turns on the color of the prospective users and yields a more extreme result
than the normal restrictive covenant case because here, those who are
clearly entitled to use the property under the terms of the will are divested
of that right. This divestiture in effect punishes Macon for not enforcing
the discriminatory provisions of the will and encourages others similarly
situated to enforce such restrictions for as long as possible;4" thus the
'" Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutioial Law, 73 IHARV. L.
REv. 1, 31 (1959).," Two other major arguments were thought by Justice Brennan to require re-
versal. One was based on the inability of a state to accept a gift with unconstitu-
tional restrictions, and the other was based on the idea that if a state gives racial
discrimination a preferred status in its laws the fourteenth amendment is violated.
396 U.S. 435, 455-59 (1970)."Id. at 456.
42 Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Itegrity, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1,
13 (1959).
" Even though the trustees under the will had resigned and had been replaced
it is apparent that they did so not out of hostility to the admission of non-whites
but out of fear the property would revert to the heirs if it were not operated on a
segregated basis. 396 U.S. at 456.
"382 U.S. 296 (1966).
" That such a result is not entirely conjectural is illustrated by litigation in-
volving Tanglewood Park near Winston-Salem, N.C. There a testator had devised
his sizeable home and grounds to private trustees to be used as a public park for
whites only. Since the park included various facilities of public accommodation,
the trustees brought an action for declaratory judgment in a state court to deter-
(Vol. 49
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coercive power of the state is used to compel and encourage parties of
different races not to deal with each other in good faith.
In Bell v. Maryland 6 Mr. Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion,
sought to show that a crucial element in Shelley was the existence of a
federally protected right to own property in addition to the equal protec-
tion demands of the Constitution. This interpretation would seem to
apply to Abney in which enforcement of the restriction would interfere
with a federally protected right of access to public facilities.4 7 Nor is it
very convincing to say that in this case there is a competing basic right-
the right of a donor to place conditions on charitable gifts-which out-
weighs the equal protection claims of the petitioners, since it is clear that
such conditions can be, and are frequently, subject to numerous restric-
tions.4
However Justice Black, writing for the majority in Abney, says that
Shelley is easily distinguishable because it prohibited judicial action
affirmatively enforcing a private scheme of discrimination against Negroes
whereas here the discrimination against Negroes is eliminated by elim-
inating the park. This distinction would be more meaningful had not
Shelley been supplemented by Barrows in which the Court prohibited
indirect enforcement of restrictive covenants by penalizing the party who
failed to comply with the covenant. The Court answers that argument,
though without specifically referring to Barrows, by saying "that the
will of Senator Bacon and Georgia law provide all the justification neces-
mine whether, in light of the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964), they could permit Negroes to use the
facilities. The state court held that the intent of the testator was to exclude Negroes
and to admit them would cause the property to vest in alternate beneficiaries of the
will; therefore, the court ordered the trustees to take whatever steps necessary to
operate the park on a segregated basis for as long as possible. Lybrook v. City of
Winston-Salem, Forsyth County Super. Ct. (Nov. 5, 1964). The trustees there-
upon closed various facilities at the park to keep it beyond the reach of the statute
until May 3, 1968 when an action was brought by the United States to compel the
integration of the park. The court found that the park was covered by the statute
and enjoined the trustees from continuing to operate it on a segregated basis.
United States v. The William & Kate B. Reynolds Memorial Park, Inc., Civil No.
C-62-WS-68 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 11, 1970). The state court then held that the in-
ability of the trustees to comply with the terms of the trust had caused the alternate
dispositons to take effect. However the court approved an arrangement by the
trustees and alternate beneficiary to lease the park to a non-profit corporation that
would operate it on an integrated basis. Lybrook v. Winston-Salem, Forsyth
County Super. Ct. (Apr. 13, 1970).
" 378 U.S. 226, 328 (1964).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 2000b (1964)."' See, e.g., 4 A. ScoTT, LAw oF TRusTs § 410, at 3174 (3d ed. 1967).
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sary for imposing such a 'penalty'."4 A similar statement could have
also been made in Barrows but there the Court, looking beyond the con-
tractual relationship of the parties, realized that the effect of allowing the
penalty would be to undermine the effectiveness of Shelley. In Abney
the Court does not appear to be concerned about the ultimate effect of the
penalty, probably because the greatest distinction between Shelley and
the problem here is one of size or degree. There is little reason to believe
that permitting the reversion in this case will result in the widespread
deprivation of federally protected civil rights that would have resulted
from the opposite decision in Shelley. ° This being so, Professor Lewis'
view of Shelley as really being a problem of delegation of the authority
of the state51 can be more easily reconciled with Abney than can most
others. The result is that Shelley in all probability can no longer be used
to support the proposition that state action, violative of the fourteenth
amendment, results whenever state courts are used by private parties to
discriminate against others in ways the state could not itself have used. 2
As Justice Black said:
Surely the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated where, as here, a
state court operating in its judicial capacity fairly applies its normal
principles of construction to determine the testator's true intent in
establishing a charitable trust and then reaches a conclusion with regard
to that intent which, because of the operation of neutral and non-
disciminatory state trust laws, effectively denies everyone, whites as
well as Negroes, the benefits of the trust.53
It seems that the Court has long felt uneasy with Shelley to the extent
that it attributes to the courts the motivations of the litigants and this
case appears to move away from that position, or at least declines to
"396 U.S. 435, 444 (1970).
50 C. VosE, supra note 16.
"Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 1083, 1115-20
(1960). As Professor Lewis noted the opinion of the Court did not approach
Shelley in this manner. This approach moreover is so substantially different from
that of the Court that its acceptance destroys Shelley as it has been traditionally
viewed.
" I viewed as being a means to an end Shelley is no longer necessary on its
own facts since the discovery by the Court that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964) applies to
individual as well as state action. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968). 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964) provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by the white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
"396 U.S. 435, 446 (1970).
[Vol. 49
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extend it. It is significant that, from the many arguments presented by
the petitioners,54 the Court chose to reply to three relatively minor argu-
ments that related to the racial neutrality of the courts because the replies
underscore the Court's distaste for attributing the racial prejudices of the
testator to the courts responsible for supervising the disposition of his
property.55 This may be indicative of a changing attitude of the Court
which will tend to give the equal protection clause a rest while relying
more on legislation to eliminate racial discrimination. Recent civil rights
legislation"5 certainly makes this feasible.
GEORGE S. KING, JR.
Insurance-Judicial Construction of the Lender's Policy of
Title Insurance
The recent trend of judicial interpretation of standard insurance
policies has been to construe policies liberally in order to provide more
comprehensive coverage for the insured. Although the courts have de-
pended upon various principles of contract interpretation to accomplish
this end, the import of adjudication in this field reveals a sound propensity
of the courts to protect the consumer. The brunt of the criticisms of in-
surance practices has recently fallen upon the underwriters of liability
insurance. However, a recent case, Paramount Property Co. v. Trans-
america Title Insurance Co.,1 expands the criticisms of liability insurance
policies to encompass the provisions of the standard lender's policy of title
' In their... briefs, the petitioners . .. have advanced several arguments
ich we have not here discussed. We have carefully examined each of these
arguments, however, and find all to be without merit.
396 U.S. 435, 448 (1970).
" To the contention that the Georgia courts had violated the Constitution by
making the "anti-Negro choice" with regard to the uncertain intent of the testator,
the Court replied that there was no constitutional obligation to resolve doubts in
favor in of integration. To the argument that the decision the trust had failed rested
on a premise by the court that integration would destroy the desirability of the
park to whites, the Court said that it was the desirability of integration to the
testator alone that caused the trust to fail. In response to the prediction of loss
to the public of many charitable trusts, the Court pointed out that state courts were
free to use or not use cy pres as they normally would. 396 U.S. 435, 445-47 (1970).
5 0E .g., Civil Rights Act of 1968, tit. VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (Supp. V,
1970) ; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 5,
28 & 42 U.S.C.).
1 1 Cal. 3d 562, 463 P.2d 746, 83 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970) (in bank). Paramount
relies heavily upon a recent case construing a liability insurance policy. Gray v.
Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966) (in bank).
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